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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LARRY M. CHAFFIN and 
GRETA M. CHAFFIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK R. CROMAR and 
GENEVE D. CROMAR, 
Defendants, Third-party 







GREG L. WINGET, BRENT E. WINGET, 
JEN S. WINGET, RIVERVIEW PLAZA 
ASSOCIATES LTD., and MERRILL TITLE 
COMPANY, 
Fourth-party Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a summary judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. The Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup granted judgment in favor of Mark R. Cromar and Geneve D. 
Cromar against Donald Dwyer in connection with a written indemnity 
agreement which essentially passed on to Dwyer the judgment that 
had been obtained by Larry M. and Greta M. Chaffin against the 
1 
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Priority No. 15 
Cromars. Judge Rigtrup refused, however, to award the Cromars 
attorneys' fees against Dwyer. It is from that refusal that this 
appeal follows. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to §78-2a-
3(2)(k), Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly interpret the Agreement 
Surviving Real Estate Closing between the parties in refusing to 
award attorneys fees for the enforcement of the Agreement itself. 
2. May the appellant raise for the first time on appeal 
issues not presented to the Court below, (See App. Brief p.2, 
Issues Presented for Review #2). 
These issues present matters of law to be determined by 
the court under a correctness standard. Gate City Fed. Sav. & Loan 
v. Dalton, 808 P2d 1117 (Utah App. 1991); Olson v. Park-Craig-
Olson, Inc., 815 P2d 1356 (Utah App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
This case raises an issue of the correct interpretation 
of a contract. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Mark and Geneve Cromar to enforce 
the terms of an indemnity agreement against Donald Dwyer. The 
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Cromars and 
against Dwyer on the principal amount, plus interest and the 
attorney's fees awarded to Larry and Greta Chaffin against the 
Cromars. The court refused to award to the Cromars the additional 
2 
attorney's fees they had incurred. The Cromars appeal from that 
adverse ruling. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Donald Dwyer accepts the statement of facts as set forth 
in the Appellant's Brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES 
TO THE CROMARS WAS CORRECT. 
1. An indemnity agreement is a contract. In order to 
recover attorney's fees on a contract action there must either be 
a statute or an express provision in the contract authorizing such 
an award. 
2. In this case, the agreement limited Dwyer's liability 
to those obligations contained in the trust deed and note. 
3. There was no provision in the Agreement for an award 
of attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the terms of the 
Agreement. 
4. The overwhelming case law authority, and the law in 
Utah, precludes an award of attorney's fees for enforcing an 
indemnification agreement unless the agreement so provides. 





APPELLANT IS ATTEMPTING TO RAISE ARGUMENTS 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
It has long been established that this Court will not 
consider arguments on appeal which were not raised before the trial 
court. Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P2d 1356 (Utah App. 
1991). Appellant, however, presents two arguments on appeal which 
were not presented to the court below, i.e., (1) the Promissory 
Note executed by Chaffins and Cromars was incorporated by reference 
into the Agreement Surviving Real Estate Closing (hereinafter "the 
Agreement"), and that, as a result, Dwyer's primary obligation to 
pay the attorney's fees incurred by the Chaffins in collecting the 
note was created by the attorney's fee language in the note itself 
(App. Brief pp. 6, 7, 12) and (2) that the Cromars are entitled to 
recover attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in 
defending against the principal claims covered by the Agreement, 
(Point II, App. Brief, p. 19-21). Even though Appellant should be 
precluded from raising these issues on appeal, since they were not 
argued below, Dwyer believes that the issues are not well taken. 
A. Dwyer Had no Duty to the Cromars Directly Under the 
Promissory Note. Dwyer was sued by the Cromars for breach of "his 
promise to assume the note and to hold the Cromars harmless." (R. 
30). Indeed, the Cromars acknowledge in their Brief that "summary 
judgment based upon the Agreement Surviving Real Estate Closing was 
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entered in favor of the Cromars and against Dwyer on November 20, 
1992." (App. Brief p.10). It is clear, therefore, that the 
Cromars' claim below and the judgment entered against Dwyer was 
based upon the Agreement and not upon the Promissory Note. The 
Cromars never contended in the court below that Dwyer had a duty to 
pay attorney's fees directly to them under the terms of the note. 
In any event, the subject note provides for the payment of 
attorney's fees to be paid by the maker to the holder1 of the note. 
The note neither contemplates nor requires the payment of 
attorney's fees to a party other than the holder. The language of 
the note provides: 
"if this note is collected by an attorney 
after default on the payment of principal or 
interest, either with or without suit, the 
undersigned (the Cromars) jointly and 
severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses 
of collection including a reasonable 
attorney's fee." (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the note required the Cromars to pay Chaffins' attorney's 
fees in the event of suit. Pursuant to the Agreement, Dwyer agreed 
to pay the attorney's fees assessed against the Cromars on behalf 
of Chaffins. Those fees are included in the Cromars' judgment 
against Dwyer. There is nothing in the note, however, requiring 
Dwyer to pay attorney's fees to the maker of the note, the Cromars. 
Since the Cromars were not holders of the note, the note's 
1
 Section 70A-1-201(20) U.C.A. defines a holder as the person 
in possession of an instrument if it is payable to bearer or to the 
order of the person in possession. 
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provisions for payment, interestf or attorney's fees are of no 
benefit to them2. 
B. The Cromars are Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees, if 
any. Incurred to Defend Against the Chaffin's Action. In 
requesting attorney's fees, the attorney for the Cromars presented 
an affidavit which lumped together all of the attorney's fees 
incurred. (R. 303-306). There is no way to tell from the Affidavit 
whether any attorney's fees were actually incurred on behalf of the 
Cromars in defending against the Chaffins' claim; indeed, in 
attempting to establish the amount of attorney's fees, Mr. Durham 
stated in his Affidavit that they were for, 
"factual investigation; preparation of 
documents, affidavits, pleadings, research and 
correspondence with respect to the defense of 
the action for summary judgment by Chaffins, 
and the prosecution of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Dwyer, including preparation 
of judgment, conferences with client, and 
opposing counsel regarding the same." (R. 304-
305) . 
Counsel's Affidavit does not state whether the "research and 
correspondence" relating to the defense of the Chaffin action was 
directed to Chaff ins' attorney or was part of the demand made upon 
Mr. Dwyer. In addition, since the Affidavit presents a total lump 
sum figure, there is no way to determine, from the record, the 
amount, if any, for which the Cromars believe they are entitled to 
compensation for defending against the Chaffins' claim. The 
Cromars, at no time, asked the trial court for an award of 
2
 The holder of an instrument may enforce payment, §70A-3-301 
U.C.A. 
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attorney's fees relating to their alleged defense of the Chaffins' 
claim. (R. 286-291). Indeed, after the ruling of the court which 
is the basis of this appeal, the Cromars made no attempt to request 
a rehearing or to point out to the court that a portion of the 
attorney's fees were allegedly incurred in defending against the 
Chaffins' claim; rather, the Cromars remained silent although they 
had ample opportunity to present the matter to the trial court. 
Having failed to do so, they should be precluded from now raising 
the issue. 
II 
AS SCRIVENER, THE DOCUMENT MUST BE CONSTRUED 
AGAINST THE CROMARS 
The Agreement was drafted by the Cromars' agent. As a 
result, any ambiguity in the document must be construed against the 
Cromars and in favor of Dwyer. Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North 
America, 669 P2d 410, (Utah 1983); Parks Enterprises Inc. v. New 
Century Realty Inc., 652 P2d 918 (Utah 1982). Dwyer believes that 
the document is clear. He agreed to indemnify the Cromars from the 
obligations contained in the Second Trust Deed and Note. To the 
extent, however, that this Court believes that the language is 
ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of Dwyer. 
A. The Court's Interpretation of the Document is 
Correct. The court in its Minute Entry determined that the 
Agreement "holds the Seller (Cromars) harmless, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, from any and all obligations contained 
in that certain first Trust Deed . . . and related note . . . and 
from any and all obligations in that certain Second Trust Deed . . 
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and related notes." The court went on to state "it is clear that 
Donald Dwyer only agreed to hold harmless the Cromars for all 
obligations contained in the two trust deeds and notes, including 
reasonable attorney's fees," (Emphasis added). (R. 319). Nothing 
is contained in the Agreement authorizing the payment of attorney's 
fees for its enforcement. It has long been the law in Utah that an 
award of attorney's fees is proper only if it is supported by 
statute or by contract. B&R Supply Company v. Bringhurst, 28 Ut2d 
442, 503 P2d 1216 (Utah 1972). In the instant case there was no 
contractual requirement that Dwyer pay the attorney's fees incurred 
by the Cromars to enforce the Agreement. The Cromars' claim 
against Dwyer is based solely upon paragraph d of the Agreement 
which reads as follows, 
"Buyer hereby holds seller harmless, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, from any and all 
obligations contained in that certain first 
Trust Deed (including the "due-on-sale" 
clause, in any) and related Note dated 
September 20, 1974, in favor of Utah Mortgage 
Loan Association Corporation in the original 
amount of $75,000, copies of which are 
attached hereto and incorporated herein, and 
from any and all obligations in that certain 
Second Trust Deed (including the "do-on-sale" 
clause, if any) and related notes dated 
November 6, 1979, in favor of Don L. Buehner, 
Univest Corporation, Larry M. Chaffin and 
Greta M. Chaff in, husband and wife, in the 
original amount of $185,000, copies of which 
are attached hereto and incorporated herein." 
(Emphasis added). (R. 33-34). 
Dwyer's agreement to hold the Cromar's harmless related to two 
separate encumbrances, the first Trust Deed in favor of Utah 
Mortgage and Loan Corporation, and the Second Trust Deed in favor 
of Don L. Buehner, Univest Corporation, Larry M. Chaffin and Greta 
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Chaffin. The first Trust Deed was foreclosed and no action was 
commenced on that debt. The instant case relates only to the 
Second Trust Deed and Note. As the court correctly noted, under 
the terms of the Agreement, Dwyer agreed to hold Cromars harmless 
"from any and all obligations in that certain Trust Deed . . . and 
related notes. Dwyer's obligation to the Cromars, therefore, is 
limited to obligations "(contained) in" the Second Trust Deed and 
in the related note3. 
Since there is nothing in either the Second Trust Deed or 
the Chaffin note which would allow the Cromars to obtain an award 
of attorney's fees against Dwyer, the ruling of the trial court 
must stand. 
B. The Agreement Does Not Provide for an Award of 
Attorney's Fees for Enforcement. Since Dwyer's obligation to hold 
Cromars harmless is clearly limited to those obligations continued 
in the Second Trust Deed and related notes, if Dwyer is to be held 
responsible for the attorney's fees incurred by the Cromars in 
enforcing the Agreement, the Agreement must contain a provision 
awarding attorney's fees "incurred in enforcing the terms of this 
agreement." The Agreement contains no such provision; therefore, 
3
 Paragraph 19 of the Second Trust Deed provides that: 
"Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, beneficiary, 
(Chaffin), shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby 
immediately due and payable and foreclose on this Deed of Trust in 
the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real 
property and beneficiary shall be able to recover in such 
proceedings all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee in such manner as shall be fixed by the 
court." 
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the trial court correctly refused to assess against Dwyer the 
attorney's fees that were incurred by the Cromars in enforcing the 
Agreement against Dwyer. Both the Second Trust Deed and the 
Chaffin note provide for an award of attorney's fees only between 
the direct parties to those documents. In the instant case 
attorney's fees were awarded to the Chaffins which are included in 
the Cromars' judgment against Dwyer. There isf however, no 
provision in the Agreement for an award of attorney's fees to the 
Cromars for attempting to enforce the Agreement against Dwyerf 
although including such language would have been a simple matter4. 
C. The Agreement is Redundant. Cromars argue that their 
interpretation of the Agreement is the only correct one since any 
other interpretation would create a redundancy in the Agreement. 
The Agreement, however, is clearly redundant. The Agreement 
provides for the buyer (Dwyer) to hold the seller (Cromar) harmless 
from "any and all obligations3" contained in the First and Second 
Trust Deeds. The scrivener, however, added "including the vdue-on-
sale' clause, if any" in reference to both the First and Second 
Trust Deed obligations. The term "any and all obligations" is all 
encompassing5 and clearly includes any damages relating to any due-
4
 "In the event of default of the terms of this agreement, the 
party not in default may recover its costs, including reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the terms . . .," or "if 
either party fails to do as agreed, he shall pay all expenses of 
enforcing this agreement, including reasonable attorney's fees," 
are two simple examples which would have obligated Dwyer to pay the 
Cromar's attorney's fees. 
5
 "All" means (1) the whole of; (2) the greatest possible; (3) 
every one of. "Any" when used as a pronoun means (1) any one or 
ones; (2) any amount. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 1974. 
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on-sale clause contained in either of the Trust Deeds. Therefore, 
the specific mention of the due-on-sale clauses in reference to 
"any and all obligations" is clearly redundant. The language used 
by the scrivener relating to reasonable attorney's fees is similar 
and is also redundant6. Since Dwyer agreed to pay "any and all 
obligations" contained in the Second Trust Deed, those would 
necessarily include both attorneys fees and due-on-sale damages 
pursuant to the terms of the Trust Deed and Note, thus the specific 
reference to attorney's fees and due on sale damages is redundant7. 
Ill 
ABSENT STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION, AN INDEMNITY 
CAN NOT RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES IN A SUIT TO 
ENFORCE THE INDEMNITY CONTRACT UNLESS THE 
TERMS OF THE CONTRACT SO PROVIDE 
An indemnification agreement is nothing more than a 
contract. In spite of appellant's contentions to the contrary, it 
is the well-established general rule that in the absence of express 
statutory language, attorney's fees can not be recovered in a suit 
to enforce an indemnity contract unless the terms of the contract 
so provide. The cases so holding are numerous. Prominent among 
them is the Tenth Circuit case of Vallejos v. C.E. Glass Co., 583 
F2d 507 (10th Cir. 1978). That case involved a suit between a 
contractor and a glass door fabricator and installer for indemnity. 
6
 Both the due-on sale clauses and the attorney's fee 
provision are proceeded by the word "including." Thus the term 
"any and all obligations" is to include both attorneys fees and due 
on sale damages as contained in the trust deed or note. 
7
 Dwyer submits that the term "any and all" is also 
redundant. 
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The court, citing a long line of cases, held that attorney's fees 
incurred in establishing the right of indemnity were not 
recoverable. In Rupp v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 465 NW2d 614 
(N.D. 1991), Plaintiff filed an indemnification action against a 
contractor for damages it paid resulting from the death of an 
employee. There was a written indemnification clause in the 
contract between the parties covering "any and all claims for loss, 
injury or damage." The court held that, 
"It is well established that an indemnitee may 
not recover attorney's fees and expenses 
incurred to establish the existence of an 
obligation to indemnify unless the agreement 
explicitly says otherwise." 
Similar holdings can be found in D'Albora v. Tulane 
University, 274 So.2d 825 (La. App. 1973), (fees attributable to 
enforcing right [to indemnification] not recoverable since contract 
did not provide for counsel fees in case of breach) ; Frankel v. 
Burke's Excavating, Inc., 269 F.Supp. 1007 (E.D. Penn. 1967), (no 
recovery of attorney's fees in connection with assertion of 
indemnification demand); Tidewater Construction Corp. v. Southern 
Materials Co., 269 F.Supp. 1000 (E.D.Va. 1967), (right to 
indemnification for attorney's fees . . . does not include services 
rendered in prosecuting the claim for indemnity). 
Such is also the law of this State. Although Hanover 
Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P2d 443 (Utah App. 1988), dealt 
with an implied right of indemnity under a strict liability theory 
in tort and is thus factually far removed from the instant case, 
12 
this Court held that an indemnitee is not entitled to attorney's 
fees incurred in establishing its right to indemnity. Id. at 450. 
IV 
APPELLANTS AUTHORITIES ARE INAPPOSITE HERE 
In attempting to persuade this court to go contrary to 
the great weight of authority, the Cromars argue that "two courts 
have recently allowed an award of attorney's fees in litigation to 
enforce indemnity rights." (App. Brief 15). The Cromars cite the 
cases of Chetopa State Bancshares, Inc. v. Fox, 628 P2d 249 (Kan. 
App.1981) and Wuertz v. Tobias, 512 So.2d 1200 (La.App.5th Cir 
1987). Dwyer has no argument with the holdings of those cases but 
they are clearly distinguishable from the facts present here. In 
Chetopa, the Kansas court clearly recognized the general rule that 
no attorney's fees would be awarded absent express contractual 
language authorizing such award. The Kansas court, however, held 
that the language of the particular indemnity contract did provide 
for an award of attorney's fees8. In Wuertz the Louisiana Court 
similarly recognized the general rule denying attorney's fees but 
held that the contract language specifically provided for an award 
of fees incurred in establishing the right of indemnity9. As a 
8
 The precise contract language was: "Sellers agree to 
indemnify and hold Stuckey harmless from and against any loss, 
damage, deficiency or expense (including reasonable attorney's 
fees) suffered or incurred by Stuckey at any time after the date 
hereof, arising from, or as a result or in respect of, the breach 
of any warranty, representation or covenant made by Seller . . ." 
@257. 
9
 The contractual language provided that "Lessee also agrees 
to pay all reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred by 
Lessor in connection with the provisions of this paragraph. @1212. 
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result, both the Chetopa and Wuertz cases are clearly 
distinguishable from the instant case since in the instant case 
there is no contractual language allowing the award of fees 
incurred in establishing the right to indemnification. Appellants 
also cite Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P2d 654 (Alaska 1976) and 
argue that "public policy" requires an award of fees. In Manson-
Osberg Co., the decision by the Alaska court was predicated upon a 
state workman's compensation statute and upon a public policy 
determination that costs of enforcing an indemnity contract under 
those terms were recoverable in Alaska10. Obviously, in Utah there 
is no such statute nor is there a long articulated public policy, 
as there was in Alaska, awarding attorney's fees. In fact, the 
opposite is true. See Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P2d 
443 (Utah App. 1988). Although Chaffin's cases are of interest, 
they relate to different facts and different contractual language, 
applied in different states with different statutes then Utah. As 
a result, they are not persuasive. 
CONCLUSION 
Dwyer's liability to the Cromars is limited by the 
express terms of the Agreement. The Agreement obligated Dwyer to 
hold the Cromars harmless from any and all obligations in the 
Second Trust Deed and related notes. There is no provision in the 
10
 In Alaska, attorney's fees are not an item of damages. 
Alaska R. Civ. P. §82. The Alaska court recognized the general 
rule but decided to go the other way. The court grounded its 
ruling on the case of Ransom v. Haner, 362 P2d 282 (Alaska 1961). 
That case is a workman's compensation case, not an indemnification 
case, and it is most difficult to glean from it the underpinnings 
for the articulated "public policy." 
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Agreement for Dwyer to pay the attorney's fees incurred by the 
Cromars in an attempt to enforce the terms of the Agreement against 
Dwyer. In Utah, there is no statute and no public policy requiring 
the payment of such attorney's fees. In fact, the opposite is 
true. It has long been held that absent a statute or express 
contract language, attorneys fees are not awarded in a contract 
dispute. The general and overwhelming rule relating to indemnity 
agreements is that absent statutory authorization an indemnitee can 
not recover attorney's fees in a suit to enforce an indemnity 
contract unless the terms of the contract so provide. In the 
instant case, it did not. The court should also reject the 
arguments and issues raised by Cromars for the first time on this 
appeal and should affirm the Order of Judge Rigtrup in its 
entirety. 
Dated this day of November, 1993. 
^JUhia/9A' 
J. THOMAS BOWEN' 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Murray, Utah 84107 
16 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
NOV 0 9 1SS3 
« f-'Ji^T N" = 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Cvrfi^f* 
LARRY M. CHAFFIN and 
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Civil No. 930539-CA 
Priority No. 15 
WHEREAS:. 
1. DONALD DWYER, (hereinafter referred to as -Buyer"), is about 
to purchase from MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D. CROMAR, (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "Seller"), the real property known as 2119 South Regent 
28 East 2100 South 
Street,/Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah; 
2. Buyer and Seller desire that certain promises survive the closing 
of said real property and the delivery of the final deed of reconveyance; 
NOW THEREFORE, In consideration of Buyer paying the purchase price of 
said real property and in consideration of Seller conveying said real 
property to Buyer, Buyer and Seller hereby agree to the following: 
a. Buyer and Seller understand that PARAMOUNT TITLE CORPORATION 
cannot guarantee or verify the figures pertaining to the first 
Trust Deed and Note 1n favor of UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION 
and the Second Trust Deed and Notes in favor of DON L. BUEHNER, 
UNIVEST CORPORATION, LARRY M.CHAFFIN and GRETA M. CHAFFIN,his wi 
If the figures used 1n the related settlement statements are 
inaccurate, Buyer and Seller mutually agree to make appropriate 
adjustements. 
b. Seller guarantees that the note secured by said first Trust 
Deed 1s current to and Including the monthly payment due May 
1, 1983. 
c. Seller guarantees that the notes secured by said second Trust 
Deed are current to and Including the monthly payments due 
June 1, 1983. 
d. Buyer hereby holds Seller harmless, Including reasonable 
attorney's fees, from any and all obligations contained 
in that certain first Trust Deed (Including the "due-on-sale" 
clause, if any), and related Note dated September 20, 1974, 
1n favor of UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION, in the original 
amount of $475,000.00, copies of which are attached hereto and 
Incorporated herein, and from any and all obligations In that 
certain Second Trust Deed (Including the "due-on-sale" clause, 
if any) and related Notes dated November 6, 1979, in favor of 
DON L. BUEHNER, UNIVEST CORPORATION, LARRY M.CHAFFIN and 
GRETA M. CHAFFIN, husband and wife 1n the original amount of 
(continued..) 
$185,000.00, copies of which are attached hereto 
and incorporated herein. 
e. The matters set forth herein shall survive the closing of the 
transaction,and the yecpwtyanee ef fcht pm'thait WUIILJ JL-J sf** 
DATED this day of June, 1983. 
+*tmyst in fa*o» a* SalUi LAELJILJ at trlnring. 
'• *>b -fifl £ 
Paul M. Durham (0939) 
DURHAM & EVANS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2424 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 2 0 1992 
SAi-TI 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH j\?r>\qM 














GREG L. WINGET, BRENT E. 
WINGET, JEN S. WINGET, 
RIVERVIEW PLAZA ASSOCIATES, 





Civil No. 900906903CN 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
000315 
The Court having granted the motion for summary judgment of 
third party plaintiffs Mark R. Cromar and Geneve D. Cromar against 
third party defendant Donald Dwyer, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that third party 
plaintiffs Mark R. Cromar and Geneve D. Cromar ("the Cromars") be 
awarded judgment against third party defendant Donald Dwyer as 
follows: 
1. For damages in the sum of $83,108.87 plus 12% per annum 
interest from and after December 13, 1991, until paid; 
costs of $95.00. ynr1-hrrmnrnf thft Court—finds.—that* it—rs 
rftnnonnbly nmH ripnt^f^ therft Tnay-jjr rnir, Mfi Hill ft wrlil\ frn—tm^l^rfr 
fehe-judgmea^-l^) be ggftgded in th^g=e€txuii, ululudingppgSxiiblo-cosfcc 
and—3rega±=f«e«sr This judgment shall also cover such additional 
costs «KHj.egal frfrtrc incurred in pursuit of the collection of this 
judgment. The Cromars are entitled to supplement the foregoing 
nnrn^ wtiy wfcf i dflTrj t filnrl with tihn Pinirl fur mlriitionnl rrt+iM imyfi' 
feeo-'^ ind- costs which may arise in the future. 
3. Plaintiff is also entitled to interest on the judgment at 
the legal rate for judgments until this judgment has been 
satisfied. it) hf * 
DATED this CxP day of -S*p«SfcHMr, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge^Kenneth Rigt#up 
Di s t r i c t Judge / 0 0 0 3 1 6 
Paul M. Dursam (0939) 
DURHAM & EVANS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2424 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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Civil No. 900906903CN 
i Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 2 0 1992 
000327 
Having considered memoranda of both counsel regarding the 
objection of third party defendant Donald Dwyer to an award of 
attorneys' fees to third party plaintiffs Mark R. Cromar and Geneve 
D. Cromar, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that third party 
defendant Donald Dwyer's objection is J&EaS&e©. 
DATED this ZO day of Saptomber, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judged Kenneth Rigtijtfp r 
Dis tr i c t Judge 
000328 
NOV 2 0 1992 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D. 
CROMAR, 




Third Party Defendant and 
Fourth Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREG L. WINGET, et al., 
Fourth Party Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY - RULE 4-501 
RULING 
CIVIL NO. 900906903 
The Court has reviewed third party plaintiff's Memorandum 
in Support of Attorney's Fees in Proposed Judgment, the third 
party defendants' Reply to Third Party Party Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Support of Award of Attorney's Fees and third 
party defendant Donald Dwyer's Notice of Objection to Proposed 
Judgment. 
000313 
CHAPPZK V. CBOMAK 
A career reading of the Agreement Surviving Real E s t a t e 
Closing entered
 b e t w e e n t h e C r o m a r s an(j D o n a i d ^ ^ ^ 
about July
 I4, 1983 discloses that Buyer Dwyer: 
hereby holds Seller (Cromars) h»^„i 
including reasonable attorney"' feel J™' 
any and all obligations contained!; ^ °? 
certain first Tr,,=t n.„.» ' .... / h l t 
Note. . . and fro- any and'al'l „„", . " i ? ^ 
in that certain Second7 Trust Deed 9 a U ° n 5 
related Notes. . . . (Emphasis added.)' ' ^ 
« is clear that Donald Dwyer only agreed to ho!d harmless the 
cromars for all obiigations contained i„ the two trust deeds 
- d notes, .including reasonable attorney's fees,.
 N o t hi ng l s 
contained in the Agreement Surviving Heal estate Closing about 
the payment of attorney's fees for enforcing said agreement 
The court concludes that third party defendant Donald Dwyer's 
Notice of Objection to Proposed Judgment is well taKen. 
The Court's Minute Entry of August u ,,„
 ( = 
» " . 1992 is corrected to 
stnfce the award of attorney's fees.
 T n e s u b m i t t e d ^ ^ 
Judgment have been modified by interlineation to reflect the 
-lings herein contained. Said Order and Judgment have been 
signed and entered, as modified, this
 2oth day of N o v e m b e r 
1992. copies of sa£d Order and Judgment are returned herewith. ' 
Dated this Z° day of November, 1992,. 
RIGTRUP 
COURT JUDGE 
00031? 
